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I. Introduction 
This paper addresses the question: how much of the wage differential between union 
members and non-members is attributable to union membership, and how much is due to 
differences in personal, job and workplace characteristics across members and non-
members?  The question is prompted by two recent developments, one substantive, and one 
methodological.   
The substantive development is the recent decline in the union membership 
premium.  Studies for the United States and Britain have traditionally found union members’ 
earnings to be 10-20% higher than non-members’.  However, for the US, Hirsch and 
Schumacher (2001) and Hirsch and Macpherson (2000) find the wage premium has been 
declining in the private sector for some time.  Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) show the 
premium has declined in both countries since the mid-1990s.  Machin’s (2001) analysis of 
longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) indicates that, although 
there was a wage gain for people moving into union jobs in the early 1990s, this had 
disappeared by the late 1990s. This paper contributes to the body of knowledge about the 
size of the union membership premium in Britain by the late 1990s. 
The methodological development is the advent of new data and relatively new 
estimation techniques permitting a fresh look at the nature of the union wage premium. 
Over the last quarter century, there have been over 30 studies estimating the union wage 
premium in Britain.  The majority of these capture the union effect through a union 
membership dummy using simple linear regression techniques.  Increasing concern about 
the possible endogeneity of the union dummy due to the non-random nature of 
membership, and a belief that the selection processes governing membership are usually 
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unobservable to the analyst, has spawned a growing literature that utilises structural models 
which explicitly tackle unobserved heterogeneity through methods adjusting for selection 
bias.  These methodological developments reflect those apparent in other strands of the 
econometrics literature, most notably the evaluation of labour market programmes 
(Heckman et al., 1999). However, concerns about the functional form assumptions 
underpinning these alternative techniques, difficulties in testing their identifying 
assumptions, and concerns that these techniques introduce their own sources of bias, have 
led some to conclude, as did H.G. Lewis (1986) nearly two decades ago, that the least-biased 
estimate of the union wage premium is the OLS.  This may account for the fact that OLS 
remains the standard estimation technique in the wage premium literature in the United 
States (see, for example, Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003; Hirsch and Schumacher, 2002).  
Yet most analysts rarely discuss the key identifying assumption underpinning the linear 
regression model, namely that selection into membership is captured with observable data.  
Nor do they discuss the fact that, for this key identifying assumption to be plausible, one 
must be able to control for all characteristics affecting both union status and wages.  This 
requires very informative data. 
In this paper, the performance of the linear estimator is re-examined.  The paper 
offers two main contributions to the previous literature.  First, linear estimation is 
considered alongside another technique, hitherto unused in the union wage premium 
literature, which shares the same causal identification assumption.  This semi-parametric 
technique, known as Propensity Score Matching (PSM), offers some notable advantages 
relative to linear estimation.  Results using the two techniques are compared, and reasons for 
differences in results are identified and discussed.  Second, it exploits a development in data 
quality, namely the advent of nationally representative data linking employers and employees 
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in the 1998 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS).  These linked data have 
advantages over data collected solely from employees – which tend to dominate the 
literature - since they provide more accurate and detailed information regarding the nature of 
the workplace.  By altering the information set entering the estimation – first utilising 
individual-level data only, and then introducing workplace-level data – the paper shows the 
sensitivity of OLS and PSM results to data quality. 
Using OLS and the full set of individual and workplace-level data, the membership 
premium varies between 5% and 12%, depending on worker type and model specification.  
However, using identical data, PSM estimates indicate no significant membership premia, 
suggesting the linear functional form assumption results in an upward bias in the OLS 
estimates with these data.  In both OLS and PSM estimates, the addition of workplace-level 
data to the individual data substantially reduces the size of any membership effect, 
suggesting that some of the union effect attributed to membership in analyses based on 
individual or household data is actually related to the ‘better’ paying workplaces that 
members enter.  Failure to take account of this results in upwardly biased estimates of the 
membership effect. 
The paper is organised in the following way.  Section II discusses the economics of 
the union wage premium and reviews ways in which biases in estimating the membership 
premium have been tackled.  Section III introduces the data.  Section IV outlines the 
estimation strategy.  Section V presents results and Section VI discusses the implications of 





II. The economics of  the union wage premium 
There are two ways unions can affect wages in the economy (Farber, 2001).  The first 
is the direct effect on the wages of workers in jobs where wages are set through collective 
bargaining.  This may affect non-members’ and members’ wages.  The second level is the 
impact that the presence of unions has in the economy: this can change the level and 
distribution of wages generally.  In theory, these general equilibrium effects may both raise 
and reduce the level of aggregate wages in the economy.  Spillover effects, in which union 
bargaining sets wages resulting in labour shedding, leading to increased labour supply in the 
non-union sector, will reduce non-union wages.  On the other hand, where non-union 
employers raise wages to keep unions out (the ‘threat’ effect) the union-non-union wage 
premium will diminish.  Since it is not possible to observe the counterfactual (wages in the 
absence of unions) this union general equilibrium effect is not easily estimable.  The union-






=D ,        (1) 
is estimable because the wages of members ( uW ) and non-members ( nW ) are observable.  
Provided differentials are small, this expression is usefully approximated by  
            nu D-D»D ,        (2) 
which says that the measured union wage premium is approximately equal to the difference 
in the proportional effects of unions on the union and non-union wage. The union wage 
premium in equation (1) can be usefully approximated by the difference in log wages, 
implying that  
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The union wage premium may reflect the direct effect of unions on the wages of 
unionised workers, and the offsetting effects on non-union workers, but the difference is 
broadly interpreted as the effect of unions on wages. This is the wage premium estimated in 
this paper, where u denotes union membership.  
 
Potential biases in the estimation of the wage premium.  The membership differential is often 
attributed to the rent-seeking behaviour of unions who, through negotiation with employers, 
are able to procure a wage premium for their members.  However, studies also find a 
membership premium even among workers whose pay is set through collective bargaining 
(‘covered workers’) (for the US see Hunt et al., 1987; Budd and Na, 2000; for Britain see 
Hildreth, 2000).  In explaining this puzzling phenomenon, some have argued that employers 
may conspire to pay lower wages to covered non-members than to members in return for 
union co-operation, since this may increase the size of the surplus to be shared between 
workers and the firm (eg. Blakemore et al., 1986).  However, even if this sort of collusion 
occurs in some cases, it seems unlikely that this could account for the size of membership 
differentials identified in the literature.  Since there appear to be no obvious mechanisms by 
which members should command higher wages than similar non-members other than 
coverage, the membership premium may be accounted for by unobserved differences 
between members and non-members which boost members’ relative earnings.  Biases in 
estimates of the union membership premium may be accounted for by data deficiencies and, 
in particular, the paucity of employer controls in the household and employee data sets often 
used to generate them.  The membership premium could be accounted for, at least in part, if 
the sorts of employer where unionisation is most likely are also better payers than non-
 7
unionised employers.  This might occur if unions target their organising efforts on 
employers with larger rents to share, or if training-intensive employers wishing to maximise 
returns to their training investment contract with a union to lower quit rates.  Workplace 
heterogeneity may also help explain the premium among covered workers if the union 
differential is positively correlated with union density since the conditional probability of 
high density given membership is higher than that given coverage. This deficiency in 
employer controls is addressed directly in this paper with linked employer-employee data 
from the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS).  As well as information on 
individual employees’ union membership, WERS contains rich information on the employer, 
including workplace-level union density and pay bargaining arrangements for occupations 
within the workplace.  
A second possible source of bias in the estimates of union membership effects on 
wages is the potential endogeneity of union status if membership is governed by a selection 
process.  Following Farber (2001), there are two selection processes.  The first is ‘worker 
choice’ in which workers only choose membership if the union wage is greater than the wage 
available to the individual outside the union.  It is often assumed that workers with a lower 
underlying earning capacity have more to gain from membership than higher quality 
workers, in which case this selection process will understate the union wage premium.  The 
second selection process arises through ‘queuing’ since not all workers desiring union 
employment can find union jobs (see Bryson and Gomez, 2002a for empirical validation of 
this model in Britain).  Under this model, union employers may choose the best of the 
workers among those desirous of a union job.  This employer selection implies a positive 
bias in the union premium but, a priori, it is not clear whether this bias is greater or less than 
the negative bias implied by worker selection. Thus, causal inference is problematic because, 
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where workers who become members differ systematically from those who do not become 
members in ways which might affect their earnings independent of membership, we can not 
infer the non-union wage for union members simply by comparing union members’ wages 
with those of non-members.  
 
Tackling biases in identifying the causal effect of membership on the union wage premium.  Broadly 
speaking, four methods have been used in the union wage premium literature to account for 
endogenous selection into membership status.  Two (fixed effects modelling (eg. Hildreth, 
1999; 2000) and identification through repeat observations on wages of individuals who 
change union status (eg. Freeman, 1984; Machin 2001)) require longitudinal data. Panel 
estimates are particularly prone to misclassification and measurement error which tend to 
result in estimates of the impact of unions that are downward biased (Robinson, 1989; 
Swaffield, 2001).  The other two approaches are viable with cross-sectional data, and can be 
labelled methods tackling either ‘selection on unobservables’ or ‘selection on observables’.  
Methods accounting for selection on unobservables dominate the literature.  In these 
studies, selection bias is addressed by modelling union status determination simultaneously 
with earnings and estimating an econometric model that takes account of the simultaneity 
(Robinson, 1989). The virtue of these techniques is that they seek to control directly for the 
presence of unobserved correlation between union membership and wages, thus purging 
estimated effects from the bias induced by unobserved heterogeneity.  However, they rely on 
exclusion restrictions whereby variables assumed to affect union status have no direct effect 
on earnings.  These assumptions are difficult to test and most data sets lack suitable 
instruments for identification (Lewis, 1986; Blanchflower, 1987).  In addition, these 
techniques invoke functional form assumptions that seem arbitrary, often assuming that the 
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errors in the earnings and union status functions are jointly normal.  These drawbacks may 
explain why simultaneous equation methods tend to produce large and unstable estimates.  
The advent of new data offering better instruments, coupled with new work on testing the 
identifying assumptions underpinning IV methods, has resulted in more persuasive IV 
estimation of the union wage premium very recently.  Booth and Bryan’s (2001) IV 
estimation of the membership premium among covered workers is of particular note 
because it uses the same data set at this paper.  Their results and how they relate to this 
paper are discussed in Section Six.   
In his review of the literature, H. Gregg Lewis (1986) concluded that, due to the 
deficiencies of simultaneous equation and panel techniques, the most appropriate way to 
estimate the impact of unions on wages is using simple linear regression. He suggests OLS 
may produce an upper bound estimate of the true impact of unions because ‘such estimates 
suffer from upward bias resulting from the omission of control variables correlated with the 
union status variable’ (Lewis, 1986: 9).  His assumption is that some of the wage premium 
attributed to union membership is, in fact, attributable in part to the characteristics of 
members, their jobs and their employers which would give them higher wages than non-
members in any case.  In practice, bias in cross-sectional OLS estimation due to unobserved 
heterogeneity may both upwardly or downwardly bias the ‘true’ impact (Farber, 2001; 
Robinson, 1989, Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003).1 Either way, if there is endogenous 
selection the membership mark up estimated using standard cross-sectional regression 
                                                 
1  Wessels (1994) has cogently argued that OLS will not necessarily provide an upper limit estimate.  His 
argument is that, provided a union has a certain degree of bargaining power, union-won increases in the wage 
that lead the firm to hire more able workers will be followed by further union actions to raise the wage.  
Knowing this and given repeated bargains, the firm will not necessarily hire more able workers.  In practice, 
Robinson (1989) shows OLS produces results which lie somewhere between the upper bound set by IV and 
Inverse Mills Ratio estimation and the lower bound set by panel estimates. 
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techniques ‘can be interpreted as the average difference in wages between union and non-
union workers, but it can not be interpreted as the effect of union membership on the wage 
of a particular worker’ (Farber, 2001: 11). 
Recently greater efforts have been made to capture selection effects using observable 
data.  This is due, in part, to evidence from the evaluation literature indicating that 
controlling for bias due to observable characteristics is more important than controlling for 
the bias due to unobservables (Heckman et al., 1998).  The regression coefficient for the 
union membership dummy in an OLS can be interpreted as the causal effect of union 
membership on wages if the variables entering the regression equation account fully for 
endogenous selection into membership status. This requires very informative data.  This 
paper assess the sensitivity of results to this assumption by varying the information set 
entering the estimation – first utilising individual-level data only, and then introducing 
workplace-level data.  
A second way of controlling for bias on observables is the semi-parametric statistical 
matching approach known as propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983; Heckman et al., 1999) which compares wage outcomes for unionised workers with 
‘matched’ non-unionised workers.2  The method shares the causal identification assumption 
of the OLS in that it yields unbiased estimates of the treatment impact where differences 
between individuals affecting the outcome of interest are captured in their observed 
attributes (often referred to as the conditional independence assumption, or CIA).  
However, matching has three distinct advantages relative to regression in identifying an 
unbiased causal impact of membership on wages.  First, it is semi-parametric, so it does not 
require the assumption of linearity in the outcome equation. Second, it leaves the individual 
                                                 
2 A full explanation of the approach is described in the appendix. 
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causal effect completely unrestricted so heterogeneous treatment effects are allowed for and 
no assumption of constant additive treatment effects for different individuals is required.  
Effects for sub-groups can be estimated by running the match on sub-populations.  This is 
particularly important when estimating the wage premium since empirical research shows the 
returns to membership differ across worker types in both the US and Britain (Blanchflower 
and Bryson, 2003).  Section V compares OLS and PSM estimates for six sub-groups: 
covered and uncovered workers; manual and non-manual workers; and men and women. 
Thirdly, matching estimators highlight the problem of common support and thus the 
short-comings of parametric techniques which involve extrapolating outside the common 
support.  Matching eliminates two of the three sources of estimation bias identified by 
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998): the bias due to difference in the supports of X 
in the treated and control groups (failure of the common support condition) and the bias 
due to the difference between the two groups in the distribution of X over its common 
support.  The other source of bias is due to selection on unobservables. This highlights the 
importance of the conditional independence assumption since, if this holds, selection on 
unobservables ceases to be a problem.  The appropriateness of the conditional independence 
assumption is dependent on having data that account for selection into membership.  
Section 2.1 indicates selection may occur through employee and employer choice, implying 
that data should be rich in employee and employer data to capture these selection processes.  
This paper takes advantage of the very informative linked employer-employee data available 
in WERS.  As in the case of the OLS estimates, the sensitivity of results to data quality is 
assessed by altering the information set entering estimation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 12
III. Data  
 
The paper uses linked employer-employee data from the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey 1998 (WERS).  Appropriately weighted, it is a nationally representative 
survey of workplaces in Britain with 10 or more employees covering all sectors of the 
economy except agriculture (Airey et al, 1999). The analysis exploits two elements of the 
survey.  The first is the management interview, conducted face-to-face with the most senior 
workplace manager responsible for employee relations. Interviews were conducted in 2,191 
workplaces between October 1997 and June 1999, with a response rate of 80%.  The second 
element is the survey of employees where a management interview was obtained.  Self-
completion questionnaires were distributed to a simple random sample of 25 employees (or 
all employees in workplaces with 10-24 employees) in the 1,880 cases where management 
permitted it. Of the 44,283 questionnaires distributed, 28,237 (64%) usable ones were 
returned. 
The sample of workplaces is a stratified random sample with over-representation of 
larger workplaces and some industries (Airey, et al, 1999).  Employees’ probability of 
selection for the survey is a product of the probability of their workplace being selected and 
the probability of the employee’s own selection.  To extrapolate from the analyses to the 
population from which the employees were drawn (namely employees in Britain in 
workplaces with 10 or more employees) analyses are weighted using the employee weights. 
The weighting scheme used compensates for sample non-response bias which was detected 
in the employee survey (Airey et al., 1999: 91-92). All estimation in the paper accounts for the 
complex sample design, that is, sampling weights, clustering and stratification. 
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The estimating sub-sample is all private sector employees with complete information 
on the variables used in the analysis.  The estimation of the union membership premium for 
the whole private sector contains 10,384 non-members and 4,147 members. Membership is 
derived from individual employees’ response to the question: ‘Are you a member of a trade 
union or staff association?’ 
The paper also exploits the bargaining coverage information in WERS based on 
management classifications of the way pay is set for each occupational group in the 
workplace. The eight possible responses include collective bargaining at industry, 
organisation or workplace-level.  The information is used to identify employees whose own 
occupational group at their workplace is covered by collective bargaining at any level.  This 
sample comprises 1,531 non-members and 2,653 members.  Coverage and membership are 
less highly correlated in Britain than in the United States because there is less pressure on 
employees to become members where there is a coverage agreement (Hildreth, 2000: 133-
134).  In the private sector in WERS, 64% of union members belong to a covered 
occupation, while 13% of non-members are covered.  Around one-third (35%) of covered 
employees are non-members. 
 
The dependent variable. The dependent variable is log gross hourly wages.  This is derived from 
banded earnings data by taking the mid-point of the respondent’s earnings band and dividing 
this by continuous hours worked.  The earnings band for the top-coded highest earners is 
closed by introducing an upper ceiling that is 1.5 times the lower band.  The hours 
denominator used includes overtime hours.3 
                                                 
3 The question asks: ‘How many hours do you usually work each week, including any overtime or extra 
hours?’ 
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Union membership wage differentials are usually higher when measured in terms of 
hourly earnings than when measured in weekly earnings because many analysts find union 
workers work fewer hours per week than non-union workers, on average (Andrews et al, 
1998).  This proves not to be the case in WERS: mean hours worked per week are 39.4 for 
members and 35.4 for non-members.  This is because the incidence of part-time working is 
much higher among non-members: part-timers were usually excluded in previous analyses 
(Green, 1988; Blackaby et al., 1991; Andrews et al., 1996).  This issue is further investigated 
by estimating the independent effect of membership and union recognition on log hours 
worked per week.  The model accounts for a substantial amount of the variance in hours (r-
squared = 0.51).  The membership effect is positive but not significant (0.38, t = 0.84) and 
workplace union recognition has a significant negative effect (-1.53, t = 3.17).4  So, although 
there is an hours differential in the data, it is not attributable to membership per se, and 
suggests that measurement of the membership differential should vary little whether 
measured in weekly or hourly wages.  Nevertheless, since the division of banded weekly 
hours by continuous hours worked introduces measurement error into the hourly earnings 




IV. Estimation strategy 
This section describes the OLS and PSM estimation techniques in turn.  A technical 
appendix gives more detail on the theory behind PSM. 
 
                                                 
4 Full models are available from the author. 
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4.1: Ordinary Least Squares regression 
The standard ‘union effect’ estimates (Lewis, 1986) are OLS estimates of equation (3) 
which take the form 
 
lnWi = Xiß + dUi + ei ,                                                      (4) 
 
where lnWi is the log wage of individual i, X is a vector of worker, job and workplace 
characteristics, U is a dummy variable indicating union membership, and e is a random 
component.  The parameter d represents the average proportional difference in wages 
between union and non-union workers adjusted for worker and workplace characteristics, 
and it is the regression-adjusted analogue of D . However, since membership is non-random 
there is likely to be non-zero correlation between membership and the error term e.  This 
arises because an individual’s membership decision is probably based on characteristics that 
may also affect earnings.  If so, and it is not possible to control for all characteristics 
affecting W  and Ui simultaneously, some correlation between the error term and 
membership can be expected.  Thus, for d  to capture the causal effect of membership on 
wages, X must contain all variables determining both wages and membership status.  The 
assumption is that individuals who are the same in the observable dimension Xi  but make 
different choices on whether or not to be a member do not differ on the average in the 
unobserved dimension ei .  In this case equation (4) can be viewed as a form of regression-
based linear matching (Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2002). If identification is accomplished, the 
parameter estimated is the effect of membership on members, that is, the gain from moving 
a member with a given set of attributes from non-membership to membership.  This is what 
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Lewis (1986:11) termed the ‘wage gap’ and, in the evaluation literature, is known as the 
‘treatment on the treated’ parameter.5 
The whole private sector analysis captures an average return to membership, 
irrespective of whether the individual – member or non-member – is covered by collective 
bargaining.  Results are also presented for sub-groups where previous research 
(Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003) indicates the premium is likely to differ markedly, namely 
covered and uncovered workers, men and women, manuals and non-manuals. In this way 
regression analyses can identify heterogeneous effects of union membership.  The other 
advantage of this approach is that it allows coefficients on all covariates to differ by sub-
group. 
To assess the additional value of linked employer-employee data relative to the 
individual-level only data available to most analysts, two model specifications are presented.  
The first contains data collected solely from the employee respondents.  Variables entering 
these models are demographics (gender, marital status, dependent children, health, ethnicity, 
academic and vocational qualifications) and job-related (occupation, nature of contract, part-
time working, if overtime required or voluntarily undertaken, occupational gender 
segregation at the workplace).  Region and local labour market conditions are included too, 
since the analyst should usually be able to match these into individual-level data.  These 
models also include whether the employee thinks there is a union on-site.  The ‘individual 
plus workplace-level’ models incorporate all of the above information, but replace the 
employee data on the presence of a union with employer data on whether the employer 
recognises a union for pay bargaining, plus union density at the workplace.  One can obtain 
                                                 
5 If a linear specification is assumed with common coefficients for members and non-members then no 
common support requirement is needed to estimate the treatment on the treated parameter (Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 2002). 
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the ‘full’ union-non-union wage differential by adding together the membership effect and 
the coverage effect.  The other data added from the managerial respondent include 
workforce composition (by gender, occupation, hours worked) and workplace characteristics 
(size, activity, industry, ownership). The additional value of the workplace-level data is tested 
by comparing the fit of models and by estimating the joint significance of the workplace-
level variables. 
Although the linked employer-employee data provide much of the requisite 
information to control for selection into membership, it is arguable that some data are 
missing.  For example, there are no data on motivation which, it has been argued, is 
positively correlated with membership and the desire to invest in workplace-specific human 
capital, thus raising wages (Budd and Na, 2000).  The data set does contain workplace tenure 
and the amount of employer-provided training undertaken, both of which may be correlated 
with this tendency.  However, because these variables may be influenced by membership 
itself, and are thus endogenous with respect to membership, their incorporation in the OLS 
–  and the estimation of the propensity score - could undermine the interpretability of 
estimated effects (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).  They are therefore excluded from 
the reported estimates.  Although the absence of data on motivation may violate the 
conditional independence assumption, the absence of workplace tenure and employer-
provided training would only bias estimates if they influenced both membership and wages. 
It is certainly the case that longer workplace tenure is independently associated with higher 
earnings (Bryson, 2002) and an increased likelihood of union membership.6 But the empirical 
                                                 
6 Two-thirds (66%) of members had been working at the workplace for at least five years, compared with 37% 
of non-members.  Conversely, 39% of non-members had been at their workplace for under two years 
compared with only 7% of members.  Regression analysis revealed an independent association between 
membership and tenure (results available from the author). 
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literature suggests that membership increases tenure by reducing the likelihood of voluntary 
quits, consistent with the theory that unions provide a ‘voice’ alternative to quitting for 
dissatisfied workers (Freeman and Medoff, 1984). There is little reason to believe that longer 
tenure might lead to membership since, unlike the United States (Budd and Na, 2000) there 
are no institutional factors that increase the likelihood of joining the union after the end of a 
probationary period.  So, in the British context, workplace tenure can be omitted without 
biasing estimates.  Similarly, it is hard to see how employee take-up of training can influence 
union membership – unless, that is, non-members are discriminated against by employers or 
unions who ensure privileged access for members, whereupon poorly trained non-members 
may have an incentive to join the union. In fact, the distribution of days spent in employer-
provided training was nearly identical across members and non-members.7 So, in spite of the 
independent effect it had on employees’ earnings (Bryson, 2002), there is little empirical or 
theoretical justification for its inclusion in the regression or propensity score estimation.  In 
any event, the sensitivity analyses reported later show the inclusion of training and tenure 
make little difference to the results.  
 
4.2: Empirical implementation of matching 
This section describes the empirical implementation of propensity score matching in 
WERS to yield an unbiased estimate of membership’s effects on the wages of union 
members. 
Since the propensity to be a union member is unknown, the first task in matching is 
to estimate the propensity to be a union member.  This is done with a probit estimating a 
                                                 
7 The measure of employer provided training is employees’ responses to the question: ‘During the last 12 
months, how much training have you had, either paid for or organised by your employer?  Include only training 
away from your normal place of work, but it could be on or off the premises.’ 
 19
(0,1) variable identifying individuals’ union membership status. The conditional 
independence assumption requires that all variables influencing membership and wages 
should be included in the estimate.8 The choice of variables is informed by previous 
empirical work (Bryson and Gomez, 2002a) and the theory underpinning the worker choice 
and queuing models of membership discussed earlier.  Variables entering the model are 
demographics (age, gender, marital status, health, ethnicity, qualifications), job-related 
(occupation, nature of contract, hours worked, gender segregation), workforce composition 
(by age, gender, occupation, hours worked), workplace (size, activity, industry, ownership, 
location) and local labour market conditions.  As with the OLS analysis, the sensitivity of the 
PSM results to the inclusion and exclusion of employer data is tested. 
The model estimating the probability of union membership for the whole private 
sector using individual-level and workplace-level data is presented in Appendix Table A1.9 
Among non-members, the predicted probability of union membership ranges from .0001 to 
.9827, with a mean of .13 and a median of .05.  Among members, the predicted probability 
ranges from .0025 to .9981, with a mean of .64 and median of .73. The distributions of 
propensity scores are presented in Graph A1 in the technical appendix: although non-
members’ scores are bunched in the lower quartile of the distribution, they nevertheless 
offer support for members throughout the distribution. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Variables that affect neither membership nor wages are clearly irrelevant.  If a variable influences 
membership but not wages, there is no need to control for differences between members and non-members 
because wages are unaffected. Conversely, if a variable influences only wages, there is no need to control 
for it since it will not be significantly different between members and their matched comparators.  This just 
leaves variables that affect membership and wages. 
9 The equivalent models for the sub-group analyses are available from the author.  In what follows, the 
matching process is illustrated with detail from the estimates for the whole private sector.  Identical 
information for all the matching undertaken is provided in the notes reporting results in Table 2. 
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As discussed in the technical appendix, matching operates by constructing, for those 
participants with support, a counterfactual from the non-participants. There are a number of 
ways of defining this counterfactual using the propensity score. This paper uses nearest 
neighbour that involves taking each treated individual (member) and identifying the non-
treated individual (non-member) with the most similar propensity score.  The matches were 
made with replacement so that, in some cases, a non-treated individual provides the closest 
match for a number of treated individuals, whereupon they feature in the comparison group 
more than once.10 To ensure the quality of matches a tolerance is set when comparing 
propensity scores.  This entails imposing a 0.002 caliper: where the propensity score of a 
treated individual falls beyond this bound for a near comparator, the treated individual 
remains unmatched.  This means of enforcing common support results in the discarding of 
138 members from the analysis, that is, 3.3% of all members. Thus, the sub-group of 
members for whom it is not possible to estimate the membership premium is very small.   
The advantage of nearest neighbour matching is that the match is as good as it is 
possible to achieve in the sense that the bias across the treatment and comparison groups is 
minimised.  In this analysis, the matches are very close: the mean difference in propensity 
scores between treated individuals and their matched comparators is .0003, and ranges 
between 0 and .0019.  However, nearest neighbour matching disregards potentially useful 
information by not considering any matches of slightly poorer quality. Over-reliance on a 
reduced number of observations can result in effects being less precisely identified.  Of the 
10,384 non-members who could potentially have been matched to the 4,009 members with 
common support, 1,584 were used as matched comparators.  In 58% of cases these matched 
comparators have a match weight of 1 because they are matched to a single treated case. The 
                                                 
10 Dehijia and Wahba (1999) find that allowing the non-treated to be used more than once as comparators 
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largest weight is 49, and in only 59 cases is a non-member used as a match for 10 or more 
members. The mean match weight for non-members is 2.53. 
The PSM estimates of mean wages are for the population from which the sample 
was drawn, taking account of the complex survey design when comparing mean differences 
across members and matched non-members. In these population estimates, the survey 
sample weight of each treatment group member is applied to the corresponding matched 
comparator(s) (Frölich et al., 2001:12).  Hence, population estimates of the union 
membership differential are based on a weight incorporating both the matching weight and 
sampling weight.  Population differences in mean earnings between members and their non-
member comparators also account for variance arising from sample stratification and 
clustering.  
To be effective, matching should balance characteristics across the treatment and 
comparison groups.  Appendix Table A2 presents comparisons of the means in the 
characteristics used to match members and non-members, as well as a measure of the 
‘distance’ of the marginal distributions of relevant characteristics in both groups 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).  For a given covariate, the standardised difference after 
matching is defined as the difference of the sample means in the treated and matched non-
treated subsamples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances 
in the treated and non-treated groups (Sianesi, 2001).  Overall, the quality of the match 
seems good, the mean absolute standardised bias for all covariates being -.35.  Standardised 
bias for each variable tends to range from -7% to +7%, and only once does it exceed 9%. 
Although achieving a reasonable balance on the X’s entering the participation equation is an 
                                                                                                                                                 
improves the performance of the match. 
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indicator of how good the match is on observables, it cannot provide an indication as to 
whether the CIA is plausible.  
Having matched on the propensity score, the mean impact of union membership is 




Table 1 reports OLS estimates of the union membership wage premium in the 
private sector as a whole and for coverage, gender and occupational sub-groups.  Using 
individual-level data only, the estimated membership premium for the whole private sector is 
15% (the exponentiated coefficient for union member in column 1).  Column 2 introduces 
data collected from the employer.  The employer variables are jointly significant and improve 
the model fit.  What is more, they reduce the membership premium by over half to 6.1%. 
This pattern, whereby the premium estimated using individual-level only data is substantially 
reduced with the introduction of workplace-level data, is repeated across the sub-group 
analyses.  The impact of workplace-level data is particularly marked for men and manual 
workers. These findings suggest that, at least in the British case, OLS estimates of the 
membership premium based on individual-level and household survey data are upwardly 
biased because some of the positive wage effect attributed to membership is actually due to 
members being employed at better paying workplaces.  There are many possible reasons why 
union workplaces might be better payers than non-union workplaces.  As noted earlier, 
unions may target organising efforts on employers with the biggest rents to share.  ‘Better’ 
employers may chose to unionise to create stable firm-employer conditions conducive to 
investment in human capital.  Alternatively, if union members are ‘better’ workers than their 
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non-member counterparts in ways unobservable to the analyst but observable to employers, 
members may be able to sort themselves into the best employers, or may be chosen by the 
best employers.11  
These analyses for the whole private sector condition on whether the individual is 
located in a workplace where the employer engages with a union in pay bargaining, as well as 
on union density at the workplace where the employee works. 12  However, if the biggest 
component of any membership premium is that generated by collective bargaining, the 
premium should be much smaller where the sub-sample consists solely of workers in 
covered occupations.  In general, all these workers should benefit from pay bargaining, 
unless employers discriminate between members and non-members.  In fact, the OLS 
estimates for covered occupations presented in columns 3 and 4 differ little from those for 
the whole private sector.  Again, the size of the premium falls substantially once account is 
taken of workplace heterogeneity, but it remains sizeable and statistically significant at 6.7%.  
On this evidence, the membership premium among covered workers, evident in other recent 
studies using individual-level data only (for the United States, Schumacher, 1999, Budd and 
Na, 2000; and for Britain, Hildreth, 2000), persists having accounted for workplace 
heterogeneity.  
Intriguingly, the 14% of employees who are members in uncovered occupations 
receive a similar membership premium of 5.7% when the OLS is run with individual and 
                                                 
11 Using French linked employer-employee data, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) find high-wage 
firms have more productive workforces and higher profits than other firms.  It may be that the unionised 
sector in Britain comprises such firms.  
12 The full union-nonunion wage differential combining membership and coverage is obtained by 
exponentiating the sum of the membership and workplace-level union recognition coefficients exp(.059 + -
.018) = 4.2%.  The union recognition dummy is never statistically significant in the equations presented in 
Table 1, but wages rise with union density.  Appendix Table ?? presents the full model for the whole 
private sector. 
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workplace-level controls.13  However, almost three-quarters (71%) of these members are 
located in workplaces where other workers have their pay set through collective bargaining.  
This suggests that these members benefit from the spillover effects of collective bargaining 
at their workplace.14 
Whole economy estimates for the United States suggest little difference in the 
membership premium for men and women (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003).  In Britain, 
there is a much bigger premium for women but there is no difference in the premium by 
gender once a public sector control is added (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003).  Contrary to 
expectations, comparing columns 5 for men and 7 for women, the membership premium in 
the private sector in WERS is much higher among men than it is among women when 
estimated on individual-level data only.  However, controlling for workplace heterogeneity in 
columns 6 and 8, the premia are virtually identical for men and women at 6.2%.  This implies 
that, among members, men tend to sort (or are sorted by employers) into better paying 
workplaces than women. 
The most striking evidence that union membership effects are heterogeneous comes 
from analyses by broad occupation.  Running analyses for manual and non-manual 
employees separately, results confirm those from other studies in showing a larger 
membership premium among manual workers (Booth, 1995; Forth and Millward, 2002).  
Indeed, with the introduction of workplace controls, non-manual workers are the only group 
of workers for whom the OLS estimates do not produce a statistically significant 
membership premium. 
                                                 
13 The uncovered worker estimates using OLS and PSM are available from the author on request. 
14 Forth and Millward (2002) find evidence of such spillover effects in their analysis of WERS. 
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Table 1 
Estimated coefficients on union membership dummy from hourly pay equations 
  (1) whole private  (2)covered occupations  (3) men  (4) women  (5) manual  (6) non-manual 
Pay  Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
                   
Union 
member 
 .140 .059  .125 .065  .165 .060  .098 .061  .204 .075  .055 .019 
  (6.34) (4.58)  (4.83) (3.16)  (5.95) (3.33)  (4.90) (3.33)  (7.12) (4.08)  (3.09) (1.17) 
                   
Sample size  14531 14531  4184 4184  7974 7974  6559 6559  5406 5406  9125 9125 
                   
R squared  .533 .579  .502 .563  .533 .5921  .4761 .5167  .4336 .4941  .5627 .6115 
                   
























                   
Model p-value   0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Workplace P-
value 
  0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
Notes. (1) OLS estimates of log gross hourly wages that use survey stratification weights and account for the presence of repeated observations on the same establishment. (2) 
Asymptotically robust t-ratios in parentheses. (3) Individual-level data models contain the following controls, all of which are dummies unless otherwise stated: gender, age (6 dummies), 
highest academic qualification (5 dummies), vocational qualifications, health problem, non-white, dependent children, married or living as married, occupation (9 dummies), permanent 
contract, part-timer, overtime hours required, overtime hours worked voluntarily, gender segregation for employee’s job at the workplace (5 dummies), region (11 dummies), 
unemployment in local labour market below 5%, respondent says union on-site, respondent doesn’t know if union is on-site.  (4) Individual + workplace-level data models contain all 
variables in (3) except the two union dummies plus: employer recognition of union for pay bargaining, union density at workplace (continuous), % working part-time, % employees who 
are women, % manual employees (3 dummies), workplace size (6 dummies), single-establishment organisation, foreign ownership, industry (9 dummies). (5) In the sub-group analysis of 
covered occupations (model (2)) union recognition is dropped because it is another coverage variable. (6) Workplace P-value is reporting significance of the adjusted Wald test for the 





Mean percentage hourly wage premium for union members using propensity score matching 
  (1) whole private  (2)covered occupations  (3) men  (4) women  (5) manual  (6) non-manual 
Pay  Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 
 Individual Individual 
+ 
workplace 





























Sample size  6092 5593  3405 3231  3711 3446  2227 1998  2567 2269  3421 3102 
F-stat  1,823= 
5.11 1,742=.15  1,318=.44 1,307=.06  
1,644= 




1.86  1,701=.77 1,581=.11 
P-value  .0240 .7018  .5063 .8045  .0170 .6275  .7025 .3296  .0006 .1733  .3799 .7443 
Bootstrap  4.1 - 14.0 - 6.9 – 3.7  -3.7 – 9.7 -8.2 – 6.0  5.5 – 16.9 -4.6 – 9.5  -4.9 – 7.7 -10.2 – 3.3  11.2– 24.6 -0.7 – 15.3  -2.0 – 10.0 -6.8 – 4.2 
Support loss  0.8% 3.3%  3.3% 5.1%  3.3% 5.6%  4.7% 8.5%  3.0% 11.8%  2.3% 3.4% 
Mean dif.  .0002 .0003  .0004 .0005  .0003 .0004  .0002 .0004  .0004 .0005  .0001 .0003 
Mean NM wt.  2.10 2.53  3.06 3.54  2.46 2.96  1.55 1.85  3.01 3.40  1.61 2.06 
Max. NM wt.  23 49  24 51  24 53  10 13  22 60  10 15 
Bias   .48 -.35  .12 -.61  .16 .29  .60 -1.04  1.24 -.04  .39 .37 
Notes. (1) PSM estimates of log gross hourly wage differential between members and matched non-members. % differential is exp(mean log wage of members – mean log wage of non-
members). Sample size is weighted with the combined match weight and sample weight. (2) Figures in parentheses are equivalent % differentials derived from WLS estimates run on the 
identical matched sample weighted by the matching weight described in the text. (3) F-stat and P-value relate to significance of PSM estimate of mean difference in log wages between 
members and matched non-members. (4) Propensity scores are derived from probit estimation of union membership (0,1) accounting for complex survey design, namely sampling 
weights, clustering and stratification).  (5) Propensity scores based on probits incorporating individual-level data only contain the following controls, all of which are dummies unless 
otherwise stated: gender, age (6 dummies), highest academic qualification (5 dummies), health problem, non-white, married or living as married, occupation (9 dummies), permanent 
contract, hours and hours squared (continuous), gender segregation for employee’s job at the workplace (5 dummies), region (11 dummies), unemployment in local labour market below 
5%, respondent says union on-site, respondent doesn’t know if union is on-site.  (6) Propensity scores based on probits incorporating individual and workplace-level data contain all 
variables in (4) except the two union dummies plus: employer recognition of union for pay bargaining, union density at workplace (continuous), % working part-time, % employees who 
are women, % manual employees, % aged under 20 years, workplace size (4 dummies), single-establishment organisation, workplace supplies goods/services to other companies, 
administrative or head office, foreign ownership, industry (9 dummies). (7) In the sub-group analysis of covered occupations (model (2)) union recognition is dropped because it is 
another coverage variable. (8) Bootstrap shows the 95% confidence interval for the bootstrapped estimates. (9) Support loss is % members lost through enforcement of common 
support using 0.002 caliper.  (10)  Mean dif. is the mean difference in propensity scores for the members and matched non-members.  (11) Mean NM wt. is the mean match weight for 
non-members. (12) Max NM wt. is the maximum match weight for non-members. (12) Bias is the mean absolute standardised bias after matching. (13) Bias is the difference of the 




Table 2 presents the PSM analyses.  These are run on identical samples to those used 
in the OLS estimates in Table 1.  The sample sizes shown in the third row of Table 2 are 
smaller than those appearing in Table 1 because, in the process of matching members to 
their nearest neighbours, PSM leaves many non-members out of the estimation sample (see 
Section IV and the technical appendix for details).  In addition, a small number of members 
have no support in the non-member population, so it is not possible to estimate membership 
effects for this subset.  Fortunately this group tends to be small, ranging between 3%-6% in 
most cases (see row 7 of Table 2).  This means common support is not a problem, so PSM 
can estimate the effect of membership on members for nearly all of the member population. 
To aid comparison with OLS, the figures in parentheses in row 2 are the wage premia 
estimated with OLS on the post-match samples that are identical to the samples on which 
the PSM effects are estimated.  As in the case of the OLS estimates in Table 1, PSM 
estimates are run with individual controls only, and with individual plus workplace controls. 
The results are striking.  Column 1 shows the membership premium based on 
matching with individual data alone is estimated to be 8.9%.  When workplace data are used 
in the matching this premium disappears and is even negatively signed (column 2).  As in the 
case of the OLS estimates in Table 1, the introduction of workplace-level data always 
reduces the membership premium, confirming the potential for upward bias in estimates 
based on individual-level data – whether estimated via OLS or PSM.  But, in stark contrast 
to the OLS estimates in Table 1 and those using the matched data in row 2 of Table 2, there 
is no significant membership premium for any type of employee where matching is based on 
individual and workplace-level data.  The OLS premia in parentheses in column 2 are always 
statistically significant, so one can discount sample size differences and common support 
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enforcement as reasons for differences in the OLS and PSM results.  Rather, the OLS 
estimates are upwardly biased due to the linear functional form assumption.  Of course, it is 
arguable that the OLS models are simply misspecified and that results could be reconciled 
through the addition of appropriate interaction terms.  In practice, this requires a great deal 
of trial and effort.  This is forcefully illustrated by the fact that the OLS-generated premium 
remains large and significant across coverage, gender and broad occupation, three 
dimensions where one is most likely to find heterogeneous membership effects.  Yet, in each 
case, the PSM-generated premia are not significant.15  It is true that, at 6.9%, the PSM 
estimate of the premium for manual workers comes close to statistical significance, with the 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval only just straying into negative territory.  So, if there is 
a membership premium for anyone, it is for manual workers. 
 
Sensitivity analyses.  Table 3 presents four sensitivity analyses.  The first row 
reproduces results from Tables 1 and 2 for the ‘baseline’ estimates.  The first two sensitivity 
analyses involve alterations to the X vector used in the OLS estimation and estimation of the 
propensity score.  The third sensitivity analysis estimates effects on weekly wages, as 
opposed to hourly wages.  The fourth involves splitting the analyses according to union 
strength at the workplace employing the worker.  In each case, the first column presents 
results from the OLS using individual-level and workplace-level controls.  The second 




                                                 
15 The membership premium for uncovered workers where matching is based on individual and workplace-




  OLS, unmatched data PSM OLS, matched data 








Sample size  14,531 5,593 5,593 
2. Exclude union recognition and 











Sample size  14,867 6,383 6,383 
3.  Add workplace training and 








Sample size  14,450 5,550 5,550 
4.  Change dependent variable to log 







Sample size  14,531 5,593 5,593 
5a.  Employees in workplaces with 







Sample size  3,949 3,582 3,582 
5b.  Employees in workplaces with 







Sample size  10,582 2,263 2,263 
Notes: (1) Percentages are the membership differentials based on exponentiated differences in log wages 
between members and non-members.  Wages are gross hourly, apart from in 3 where weekly gross wages are 
estimated. (2) For OLS estimates, figures in parentheses are asymptotically robust t-ratios; for PSM they are p-
values for f-statistics. (3) All estimates incorporate individual-level and workplace-level data.  (4) All estimates 
are for the whole private sector, except for analyses run on high and low union density workplaces. 
 
Although there is a sizeable union wage premium literature conditioning on 
bargaining coverage and union density, it is at least arguable that density and union 
recognition are endogenous with respect to membership in that these workplace features are, 
in part, a function of individuals’ decisions to unionise.  A comparison of results in row 2 
Table 3 with the whole private sector estimates in row 1 shows the premium estimates rise in 
the absence of density and recognition controls.  However, the pattern of results remains the 
same, with OLS producing sizeable and statistically significant premia, whereas the PSM 
estimate is small and statistically non-significant. 
For reasons set out in Section IV, workplace training and workplace tenure were 
omitted from the earlier estimates.  Their inclusion in row 3 of Table 3 makes no difference 
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at all to the PSM estimates, and very little difference to the OLS using matched data.  The 
premium estimated with OLS on unmatched data falls a little.  
As noted in Section III, there is the potential for measurement error in the hourly 
earnings measure and estimates of the wage premium can differ across hourly and weekly 
earnings measures due to different working patterns of members and non-members.  Row 4 
in Table 3 therefore shows the sensitivity of results to the use of a weekly earnings measure.  
Again, the pattern of results is largely unchanged. 
Empirical evidence for Britain (Stewart, 1987) and the United States (Schumacher, 
1999) indicates that the union premium is higher where union density is higher.  This may be 
because a higher incidence of ‘free-riding’ can weaken union bargaining strength, or else 
causation may work the other way if the incentive to join a union is higher where the union 
commands a larger premium.  Splitting the analysis into employees working in lower and 
higher density workplaces offers limited support for the proposition that the membership 
premium is higher where the union is stronger.  Using OLS to estimate the membership 
effect on unmatched data, the premium is much larger among employees in workplaces with 
50%+ density than it is among those located in workplaces with less than 50% density.  
There is also a differential using PSM although the premium is not significant in either case. 
Across all these sensitivity analyses, OLS identifies a sizeable and statistically 
significant membership premium whereas PSM finds no significant premium, supporting the 








The paper estimates the union wage premium in Britain’s private sector at the end of 
the 20th Century after nearly two decades of union decline.  It examines the performance of 
the linear estimator, which continues to dominate the literature, alongside a semi-parametric 
technique known as Propensity Score Matching.  The techniques share the same key 
identifying assumption, namely that selection into membership is captured with observable 
data, an assumption which means both techniques demand very good employee and 
employer data to capture the selection process.  These data are not usually available in 
individual or household surveys, raising questions about the possible size and direction of 
biases in the estimated union membership premium.  Capitalising on rich linked employer-
employee data, the paper investigates the performance of the two estimators and, by altering 
the information set entering estimation, shows the sensitivity of OLS and PSM results to 
data quality.  
Using OLS and the full set of individual and workplace-level data, the membership 
premium varies between 5% and 12%, depending on worker type and model specification.  
However, using identical data, PSM estimates indicate no significant membership premium 
in the private sector, or across sub-groups of workers (covered, uncovered, men, women, 
manuals, non-manuals, those in highly unionised and less unionised workplaces).  The results 
suggest the linear functional form assumption results in an upward bias in the OLS estimates 
with these data.  In both OLS and PSM estimates, the addition of workplace-level data to the 
individual data substantially reduces the size of any membership effect, suggesting that some 
of the union effect attributed to membership in analyses based on individual or household 
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data is actually related to the ‘better’ paying workplaces that members enter.  Failure to take 
account of this results in upwardly biased estimates of the membership effect. 
In a recent paper which also uses the linked employer-employee data in WERS, 
Booth and Bryan (2001) estimate the membership premium among covered workers in 
Britain’s private sector.  They also find significant premia using OLS but no significant 
premia when estimating using IV techniques.  Although their paper differs in a number of 
ways from this paper, it lends further support to the suggestion that OLS estimates may be 
upwardly biased.  Taken together, the two papers support the contention that there was no 
union membership wage premium in the late 1990s for Britain’s private sector workers.16 
If this situation persists, the question raised is: why don’t union members leave the 
union?  Well, they have been leaving: union density is in decline, even within unionised 
workplaces (Millward et al, 2000, chapter 5).  However, evidence for the period 1983-2001 
indicates that the rate at which employees have left membership has not risen and that the 
decline in membership is due to an increase in employees who have never been members 
(Bryson and Gomez, 2002b). It may well be that the returns to membership have declined.  
                                                 
16There are a number of ways in which Booth and Bryan’s (2001) paper differ from this paper.  First, 
they use a more restricted data set, namely workplaces with 25 or more employees including an interview with a 
worker representative.  These workplaces are not representative of the whole private sector.  Secondly, they use 
interval regression techniques to estimate log hourly wages with the banded pay data.  Interval regression 
analyses were run to test the sensitivity of the results in this paper, but the results are very similar.  Third, the 
IV technique recovers a different parameter from the matching approach: IV recovers the local average 
treatment effect, whereas the matching estimator and OLS are used here to recover the effect of treatment on 
the treated.  Fourth, the IV technique explicitly accounts for unobserved correlation between wages and 
membership status, whereas matching only tackles selection on observables. 
 
 33 
However, there are at least three reasons why it is not possible to read off employees’ likely 
membership intentions from the wage premium they face.  The first is that, as some suggest, 
the trend may not be secular.  Instead, the premium may counter-cyclical, rising when 
economic conditions deteriorate (Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003).  In any event, one can 
make the case for remaining in a union if – as the sensitivity analyses suggest - union density 
has a role to play in the size of the wage premium unions can extract from the employer.  If 
members were to leave, the prospects of bargaining for better wages will deteriorate.  
Second, members are unlikely to value membership purely in terms of the wage mark up 
unions command.  Members also benefit directly by unions’ efforts to improve non-
pecuniary benefits, job security, the handling of grievance and disciplinary matters, and by 
encouraging management to treat all employees more fairly.  Third, many join and remain 
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Technical Appendix: Causal inference through statistical matching 
 
To establish whether the union membership wage premium is due to membership, 
or is due to systematic differences in personal, job and workplace characteristics across 
members and non-members, we need to isolate the causal effect of union membership on 
wages.  Let us conceive of union membership as if it were a ‘treatment’ that the individual 
receives.  We wish to evaluate the causal effect of this treatment (treatment 1) relative to 
non-membership (treatment 0) on an outcome variable, Y, gross earnings. Let Y1 be earnings 
if the individual received treatment 1 (that is, where the individual is a union member) and Y0 
be the earnings that would result if the same individual received treatment 0 (non-
membership). Let us denote the binary indicator of the treatment actually received as 
DÎ{0,1}, while X is a set of attributes which are not affected by the treatment 
(demographic, job and workplace-related). 




?  = Y  – Y0I          (A1) 
 
which is simply the difference between the individual’s potential outcome if ‘exposed’ to 
membership and the individual’s potential outcome from non-membership. To estimate the 
impact of membership on members’ earnings, it is necessary to know what the outcome 
would have been if the individual had not been a member. The problem is that we can not 
observe the counterfactual, namely the outcome which would have resulted if an individual 
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had made an alternative choice (that is, if members had chosen non-membership, and vice 
versa).  Either Y1i  or  Y0i is missing for each i .  Thus, our problem is one of estimating 
missing data.  This counterfactual cannot be inferred directly from the outcomes of non-
members since they are likely to differ substantially in their characteristics from members.   
To overcome this selection problem, researchers must choose from a range of evaluation 
methods, the choice being determined by a number of factors including the richness of the 
data and the nature of the treatment.  Because it is impossible to observe the individual 
treatment effect, each method relies on generally untestable assumptions to make causal 
inferences (Holland, 1986).  In order to identify individual treatment effects, it is necessary to 
make very strong assumptions about the joint distribution of Y1i  and  Y0i .  However, the 
average treatment effect at the population or sub-population level can be identified under 
generally less stringent assumptions, some of which are set out below.  Among the 
parameters that only depend on the marginal distributions of Y1i  and  Y0i is the parameter 
most commonly estimated and the one estimated in this paper, namely the mean impact of 
treatment on the treated: 
 
 q = E(Y1 – Y0 | D = 1, X)   = E(Y1 | D = 1, X) - E(Y0 | D = 1, X)  (A2) 
 
where D=1 denotes treatment (membership), D=0 denotes non-treatment (non-
membership) and X is a set of conditioning variables.  In assessing the expected treatment 
effect for individuals who are union members, we are addressing the question of how 
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members’ earnings compare with what they would have received had they not been 
members, on average.17  
For members we observe Y1 so that the average observed outcome for participants is 
an unbiased estimate of the first component of the effect of treatment on the treated E(Y1 | 
D = 1, X).  The evaluation problem arises from the term E(Y0 | D = 1, X).  This is the mean 
of the counterfactual which, since it is unobservable, must be identified and estimated on the 
basis of some usually untestable identifying assumptions justifying the use of the observable 
pairs (Y1 , D = 1) , (Y0 , D = 0). 
Members may not be a random sample of all employees.  If there are systematic 
differences in characteristics across members and non-members that are likely to influence 
earnings, failure to take account of these will bias any estimate of the union membership 
effect on earnings.  Thus, E(Y1 | D = 1) - E(Y0 | D = 0) would in general be biased for the 
effect of treatment on the treated.  An exception is when the independence assumption Y0 ^ 
D can be invoked.  This is credible where the random assignment of individuals to treatment 
ensures that potential outcomes are independent of treatment status.  In this situation, E(Y0 
| D = 1) = E(Y0 | D = 0) = E(Y | D = 0) so that the treatment effect can be consistently 
estimated by the difference between the observed mean of the outcome variable for the 
treatment group and the observed mean for the non-treatment group. 
In the absence of random assignment, one option is to construct a comparison 
group based on statistical matching.  Matching estimators try to resemble an experiment by 
choosing a comparison group from all non-participants such that the selected group is as 
similar as possible to the treatment group in observable characteristics.  Matching can yield 
                                                 
17 To obtain the average treatment effect on the non-treated E(Y1 - Y0 | D = 0) the procedure is applied 
symmetrically.  The average treatment effect E(Y1 - Y0) is a weighted average of the treatment effects for 
the treated and non-treated. 
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unbiased estimates of the treatment impact where differences between individuals affecting 
the outcome of interest are captured in their observed attributes.  This assumption, which is 
often referred to as the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), is the key identifying 
assumption underpinning the matching methodology.  The precise form of the CIA depends 
on the parameter being estimated.  For the treatment on the treated parameter, the CIA 
requires that, conditional on observable characteristics, potential non-treatment outcomes 
are independent of treatment participation.  Formally,  
 
 E(Y0 | X, D = 1) = E(Y0 | X, D = 0)       (A3) 
 
Thus, CIA requires that the chosen group of matched controls does not differ from 
the group of treated by any variable which is systematically linked to the non-participation 
outcome Y0, other than on those variables that are used to match them.  This permits the use 
of the matched non-participants to measure how participants would have fared, on average, 
had they not participated. 
The plausibility of the CIA depends on the informational richness of the data since 
the set of X’s should contain all the variables thought to influence both participation (that is, 
membership) and the outcome (earnings) in the absence of participation. We discuss how 
likely it is that the CIA is met in this analysis in Sections 3 and 4.    
Under CIA,  
 
E(Y1 | D = 1) - E(Y0 | D = 1) = Ex|D=1{E(Y|X, D = 1) - E(Y|X,D = 0)} (A4) 
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Hence, after adjusting for observable differences, the mean of the no-treatment (potential) 
outcome is the same for those receiving treatment as for those not receiving treatment.  This 
allows non-participants’ outcomes to be used to infer participants’ counterfactual outcomes.  
However, this is only valid if there are non-participants for all participants’ values of X (this 
is known as the support condition): 
 
 Pr (D = 1 | X )  < 1        (A5) 
 
This ensures that all treated individuals have a counterpart in the non-treated 
population for each X for which we seek to make a comparison.  If there are regions where 
the support of X does not overlap for the treated and non-treated groups, matching can only 
be performed, and the treatment parameter, q, retrieved, over the common support region.  
If treated individuals have no support in the non-treated population, they are dropped from 
analysis and the estimated treatment effect is redefined as the mean treatment effect for 
those treated falling within the common support. 
Matching operates by constructing, for those participants with support, a 
counterfactual from the non-participants. There are a number of ways of defining this 
counterfactual (Heckman et al., 1997). Once the counterfactuals are identified, the mean 
impact of union membership can be estimated as the mean difference in the outcomes of the 
matched pairs. 
A refinement to the matching approach was introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983).  If the CIA is met and there is common support then: 
 
Y0 ^ D | P(X) for X in X         (A6) 
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where P(X) is the propensity score, the conditional probability of participating in the 
treatment – in our case, the probability of being a union member – given a vector of 
observed characteristics X.18 Formally, 
 
 P(Xi) = Pr(Di = 1 | Xi)       (A7) 
 
Rosenbaum and Rubin show treatment and the observed covariates are conditionally 
independent given the propensity score, that is: 
 
      Di ^ Xi  | P(Xi)         (A8) 
 
The advantage of Rosenbaum and Rubin’s innovation is that the dimensionality of 
the match can be reduced to one.  Rather than matching on a vector of characteristics, it is 
possible to match on just the propensity score.  This is because, as Rosenbaum and Rubin 
show, by definition treatment and non-treatment observations with the same value of the 
propensity score have the same distribution of the full vector of regressors X.  Having 
matched on the propensity score, the mean impact of union membership is estimated as the 
mean difference in the outcomes of the matched pairs.  
 
 
                                                 
18 P(X) is shorthand notation for P(D=1|X). 
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 Appendix Table 1: Individual union membership status in the private sector 
 
Demographics:  
Age (ref.: under 20)  
20-24 years .260 (2.12) 
25-29 years .463 (4.11) 
30-39 years .736 (6.54) 
40-49 years .834 (7.03) 
50+ years .772 (6.39) 
Highest academic qualification (ref: none)  
CSE .069 (1.04) 
GCSE -.049 (0.76) 
A-level or equivalent -.095 (1.27) 
Degree or post-graduate -.255 (2.71) 
Female .008 (0.14) 
Married or living as married .074 (1.61) 
Health problem .065 (0.84) 
Member of non-white ethnic group .155 (1.70) 
  
Job-related:  
Occupational classification (ref.: operative)  
Manager/senior administrator -1.084 (8.27) 
Professional -.588 (5.39) 
Associate professional and technical -.500 (4.30) 
Clerical and secretarial -.994 (9.01) 
Craft and skilled service -.139 (1.87) 
Personal and protective service -.952 (6.43) 
Sales -.472 (5.13) 
Other unskilled occupations -.649 (7.27) 
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Permanent contract .209 (1.92) 
Hours worked (continuous) .017 (2.50) 
Hours worked squared -.000 (1.48) 
Occupation performed solely by men .115 (1.98) 
  
Workforce composition:  
Percentage female is <25% .064 (0.97) 
Percentage part-time is <10% -.165 (2.34) 
No workers aged under 20 years -.055 (0.86) 
No manual workers .249 (3.33) 
  
Workplace:  
Union recognised for pay bargaining .450 (5.33) 
Union density .026 (19.63) 
Size (ref: 10-99 employees)  
100-199 employees .076 (1.10) 
200-499 employees .279 (3.78) 
500+ employees .326 (4.18) 
Foreign-owned -.042 (0.65) 
Single independent establishment -.153 (2.09) 
Workplace activity (ref: producers of goods/services for consumers, producers for other parts of 
organisation, non-producers)  
 
Administrative office only .043 (0.36) 
Supplier to other companies -.168 (2.82) 
Industrial classification (ref.: manufacturing, utilities, construction)  
Wholesale and retail distribution .040 (0.49) 
Hotels and Restaurants .547 (3.46) 
Transport and communication .084 (0.81) 
Financial Services .275 (2.57) 
Other business services .197 (1.67) 
Other .528 (4.48) 
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Location (ref: East, East Midlands, London, South East, Yorkshire and Humberside, North 
East) 
 
North -.184 (1.74) 
North West .076 (0.88) 
Scotland -.027 (0.35) 
South West -.093 (1.03) 
Wales .082 (0.51) 
West Midlands -.017 (0.22) 
Local labour market conditions:  
Unemployment rate of 5%+ .155 (3.21) 
  
Constant -2.689 (11.46) 
  
Observations 14,531 
F-stat 51, 972 = 51.41 
Prob >f 0.0000 
Note: Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses 
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Appendix Table 2: Imbalance in means between treated and matched comparators, 








Members % bias before 
match 
% bias after 
match 
Age      
20-24 years .11 .04 .04 -30.35 -2.23 
25-29 years .16 .12 .11 -12.96 -1.03 
30-39 years .27 .32 .31 9.86 -1.32 
40-49 years .20 .28 .30 23.08 4.56 
50+ years .20 .24 .23 8.03 -1.47 
      
Highest academic qualification      
CSE .12 .13 .13 4.45 1.20 
GCSE .28 .27 .28 -.76 .95 
A-level or equivalent .17 .16 .15 -4.52 -3.01 
Degree or post-graduate .22 .15 .15 -18.64 .32 
      
Female .50 .38 .35 -31.41 -5.73 
Married or living as married .64 .75 .76 28.84 3.81 
Health problem .05 .07 .06 7.60 -2.09 
Member of non-white ethnic group .04 .04 .03 -1.28 -4.89 
      
Occupational classification      
Manager/senior administrator .15 .09 .08 -21.80 -1.03 
Professional .09 .09 .09 -.66 2.09 
Associate professional and technical .08 .13 .10 6.89 -13.27 
Clerical and secretarial .23 .19 .19 -10.27 2.21 
Craft and skilled service .08 .18 .18 31.73 .75 
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Personal and protective service .08 .02 .02 -25.75 -.34 
Sales .13 .07 .07 -19.12 -1.01 
Other unskilled occupations .09 .06 .06 -12.91 .58 
      
Permanent contract .94 .95 .97 15.29 8.43 
Hours worked (continuous) 37.54 39.14 39.69 19.94 4.83 
Hours worked squared 1578.35 1635.27 1671.84 12.20 4.24 
Occupation performed solely by men .15 .25 .27 31.56 4.34 
      
Percentage female is <25% .26 .45 .47 47.71 5.68 
Percentage part-time is <10% .53 .61 .65 25.79 7.16 
No workers aged under 20 years .22 .29 .30 17.85 3.02 
No manual workers .21 .22 .22 2.22 .67 
      
Union density 11.81 59.97 60.14 192.45 .68 
Union recognition .26 .87 .87 159.89 2.00 
      
Workplace size      
100-199 employees .18 .22 .21 6.02 -3.17 
200-499 employees .17 .35 .33 38.91 -4.95 
500+ employees .08 .19 .18 30.59 -3.69 
      
Foreign-owned .18 .21 .21 6.59 -1.58 
Single independent establishment .29 .13 .10 -49.32 -6.89 
      
Workplace activity       
Administrative office only .07 .03 .04 -11.75 6.33 
Supplier to other companies .34 .25 .24 -22.70 -1.44 
      
Industrial classification       
Wholesale and retail distribution .23 .11 .11 -33.94 -.34 
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Hotels and Restaurants .07 .02 .01 -29.16 -1.01 
Transport and communication .05 .13 .12 29.41 -5.56 
Financial Services .07 .13 .13 20.21 0 
Other business services .16 .04 .03 -44.07 -3.74 
Other .15 .11 .09 -17.32 -5.64 
      
Location       
North .04 .07 .08 16.28 7.07 
North West .08 .13 .13 18.85 -.49 
Scotland .09 .12 .11 8.65 -2.10 
South West .09 .10 .11 5.53 1.84 
Wales .04 .05 .05 4.52 .13 
West Midlands .08 .10 .09 4.86 -4.07 
      
Unemployment rate of 5%+ .48 .60 .56 16.82 -8.47 
      
      
Average absolute standardised bias pre-
match, whole sample  
    24.54 
Average absolute standardised bias post-
match, whole sample  
    3.21 
Average absolute standardised bias pre-
match, matched sample  
    8.90 
Average absolute standardised bias post-
match, matched sample  
    -.35 
Absolute bias reduction      61.29 
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Graph A1: Predicted union membership probability for members and non-members, 
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